[tahoe-dev] [tahoe-lafs] #625: Can't repair read-only dirnodes/mutable-files (was: Deep-check chokes on readonly dirnodes that need repair)
tahoe-lafs
trac at allmydata.org
Tue Apr 7 19:28:24 PDT 2009
#625: Can't repair read-only dirnodes/mutable-files
---------------------------+------------------------------------------------
Reporter: francois | Owner: warner
Type: defect | Status: assigned
Priority: minor | Milestone: 1.5.0
Component: code-dirnodes | Version: 1.3.0
Keywords: | Launchpad_bug:
---------------------------+------------------------------------------------
Changes (by warner):
* milestone: 1.4.0 => 1.5.0
Comment:
Nope, this is getting bumped again.. we haven't made enough progress on
it. The new test harness is in place ({{{NoNetworkTestGrid}}}), but I'm
still not sure how we should handle it. The root issue is that readonly
dirnode don't give us enough information to compute the Write Enabler (by
design), and when repair needs to create new shares, it must give those
shares a Write Enabler so that later writers can modify those shares.
We've considered changing the storage-server protocol to have the server
validate shares (by checking their signatures): this would remove the need
for Write Enablers, but would also obligate servers to know more about the
client's data format (causing version dependencies between clients and
servers) and increasing the workload of the servers. Despite these
tradeoffs, I think we're likely to move in this direction when we
implement Accounting, since Write Enablers are a nuisance (and require an
encrypted transport layer, which it would be nice to avoid).
But until then, we may have to decide between being able to repair read-
only mutable files, and being able to modify those shares later. One
possible change (that wouldn't involve modifying any protocols) would be
to have the repairer provide an all-zeros Write Enabler, and then if
anyone tries to modify the share again later, have the server validate the
signatures and replace the WE if they check out. This would have some
security implications, in particular making it possible to cause rollbacks
in certain situations.
--
Ticket URL: <http://allmydata.org/trac/tahoe/ticket/625#comment:5>
tahoe-lafs <http://allmydata.org>
secure decentralized file storage grid
More information about the tahoe-dev
mailing list