[tahoe-dev] Hello again, Pubgrid Re: Goodbye Pubgrid

[Greg Troxel]

I am not fond of the public gateway (being used for other than public
content) at all, because it teaches people to use the WUI to handle
sensitive data.

  Now the question is: how can we put back up a public gateway so that
  people can see how it works *without* first downloading it, while
  deterring other people from using it for hosting problematic files?
  Suggestions welcome.

* write size limit

  For files created or written by the public gateway, limit size to a
  few kilobytes, perhaps only 1 kilobyte.  It seems unlikely that there
  are files of that size that it's both true that the copyright holder
  would object and that other people would try to distribute this way.

* read size limit

  If public read were available, then someone could upload a large file
  via locally-installed tahoe tools, and then direct others to use the
  gateway to download it.  So this leads to "limit read and write via
  the gateway to a kilobyte or so".  But that makes your blog hard to
  publish.

  On top of this, the gateway could accept somehow (being told to read a
  file?) a pgp-signed manifest, and then allow downloading those files.
  That way you could publish your blog, and other known members of the
  community could do that.

* rate limit

  Put a download limit of say 2.5 KB/s per IP address on the gateway.
  If the gateway is substantially less attractive than other means of
  distributing files, perhaps it won't be misued.

* defer tahoe blog publishing

  Consider if these issues are a distraction to things like enforced
  reciprocal sharing/accounting/etc.  I sort of see the point of blog
  publishing via tahoe, but it doesn't have strong anonymity, and thus I
  don't really.  If there isn't anonymity, the same mechanisms for
  storage authorization could perhaps be used to tie back to the writer
  and provide responsibility for publishing.   That's a scary property,
  but it forces the issue and IMHO  traceable and untraceable are useful
  and the middle ground is much more puzzling.  tahoe is definitely in
  the middle ground, and once you add tor it's not clear there are any
  residual anonymity properties in tahoe.
-------------- next part --------------
A non-text attachment was scrubbed...
Name: not available
Type: application/pgp-signature
Size: 194 bytes
Desc: not available
URL: <http://tahoe-lafs.org/pipermail/tahoe-dev/attachments/20110807/0b2e85ba/attachment.pgp>