removing IP-address autodetection, Tor integration

[David Stainton]

Yes the "direct onion services" are a very good feature for the Tahoe
+ Tor combo... especially with regards to how most people would like
to use tools like Tahoe-LAFS to transfer largish amounts of data.
Furthermore if/when we release Tahoe+Tor integration I'd like to write
a short little release note about not abusing the Tor network's
resources.

And on a related topic: I hope Tor Project gets the funding they need
to fix the Tor hidden services design to provide stronger anonymity
guarantees.


On Sat, Jun 20, 2015 at 11:12 PM, meejah <meejah at meejah.ca> wrote:
> Brian Warner <warner at lothar.com> writes:
>
>> But is that.. useful? Safe? You aren't hiding the server's address.. I
>> guess you're making life easier for clients who want to come in via Tor
>> (we could make them prefer the onion address, and avoid exit nodes), but
>> it'd be slower than the usual tor-to-the-public-IP exit-node style. Who
>> would it protect?
>
> .onion addresses are self-authenticating if this helps?
> Also, Tor has been talking about "direct onion services" (i.e. non-
> hidden "hidden service") and possibly adding support for single-hop
> circuits on the service-side (since the server isn't trying to
> hide). So, 2 fewer hops.
>
> See: https://trac.torproject.org/projects/tor/ticket/2555
> and: https://lists.torproject.org/pipermail/tor-dev/2015-April/008625.html
>
> --
> meejah
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