[tahoe-lafs-trac-stream] [tahoe-lafs] #1427: Differences between Freenet and Tahoe

[tahoe-lafs]

#1427: Differences between Freenet and Tahoe
-------------------------+-----------------------
     Reporter:  marlowe  |      Owner:  marlowe
         Type:  task     |     Status:  new
     Priority:  major    |  Milestone:  undecided
    Component:  unknown  |    Version:  1.8.2
   Resolution:           |   Keywords:  docs
Launchpad Bug:           |
-------------------------+-----------------------

Comment (by gwern):

 Seems like an easy answer. I don't know everything about Tahoe or Freenet,
 but I read a few papers. Here is my shot, sans formatting or anything:

 ---

 Tahoe and Freenet aim at different goals: Tahoe aims at spreading content
 which could be anything, while Freenet aims at spreading some content
 which could be spread by anyone.

 If you insert a file into Freenet, it will be next to impossible to trace
 it back to your node, or for anyone who figure out who has downloaded it
 through Freenet. However, by default Freenet does not keep the file
 contents a secret; anyone can look at the file plaintext. (Freenet's
 papers are explicit about this: the encryption on the filestore is
 perfectly breakable and the purpose is to provide *plausible
 denialability*.) To get secrecy of the file content, you would need to
 encrypt it and transmit the key separately; to get FEC/redundancy, you
 would need to explicitly generate and insert the split files, etc. As
 well, Freenet nodes expire and delete unpopular content, so no persistence
 is guaranteed. (It's not a good idea to try to put your backups onto
 Freenet.)

 In contrast, content inserted into a Tahoe network is heavily encrypted to
 the user's private keys; anyone else, like an attacker, can easily
 reassemble the split components of the encrypted file into the full
 encrypted file (that is the point!) but what do they do with this
 encrypted file? Nothing. However, an attacker can easily watch transfers
 between Tahoe nodes and figure out who inserted the file and likely who
 has downloaded it. Tahoe does not, like Tor or Freenet do, seek to confuse
 watchers with randomized junk traffic or carefully encrypted connections
 between nodes. Tahoe offers integrity of content, secrecy of content,
 longevity of content - but not anonymity of content.

-- 
Ticket URL: <http://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1427#comment:2>
tahoe-lafs <http://tahoe-lafs.org>
secure decentralized storage