[tahoe-lafs-trac-stream] [tahoe-lafs] #982: grsec disallows tahoe from learning its own IP address
tahoe-lafs
trac at tahoe-lafs.org
Thu Jun 16 22:01:56 PDT 2011
#982: grsec disallows tahoe from learning its own IP address
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Reporter: ioerror | Owner: warner
Type: defect | Status: new
Priority: minor | Milestone: undecided
Component: code | Version: 1.6.0
Resolution: | Keywords: security grsec
Launchpad Bug: |
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Comment (by zooko):
So, is it the intent of someone who is running tahoe under grsec's "high"
security mode that tahoe shouldn't be allowed to learn its own IP address?
Or is it the intent that this would be okay for tahoe to learn its own IP
address, but not okay to open {{{/proc/net/dev}}} for reading?
If the former, then I agree that with ioerror's comment:2 that tahoe
should handle failure of {{{getmyipaddr()}}} (which may require manual
configuration of the IP address on the part of the user, or may involve
tahoe running without knowing its IP address, which it can do with
potentially reduced functonality). If the latter, then we should figure
out a way to learn our IP address which doesn't require such high
privileges that grsec denies it.
The way tahoe is currently trying to learn its IP address is by running
{{{/sbin/ifconfig}}} without any elevated privileges
([source:trunk/src/allmydata/util/iputil.py?annotate=blame&rev=4971#L177
soure code]). What if grsecurity allowed {{{/sbin/ifconfig}}} to have
read-only access to {{{/proc/net/dev}}} when it ({{{/sbin/ifconfig}}})
doesn't have any elevated privileges? Would that fit the intent of
grsecurity users?
This is more a question for grsecurity folks than Tahoe-LAFS folks, so
I'll post a note to their mailing list to ask.
--
Ticket URL: <http://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/982#comment:5>
tahoe-lafs <http://tahoe-lafs.org>
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