[tahoe-lafs-trac-stream] [tahoe-lafs] #1874: Non-Repudiation Not covered in Integrity

[tahoe-lafs]

#1874: Non-Repudiation Not covered in Integrity
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 Reporter:  calltodsi                            |          Owner:
     Type:  defect                               |  Narendiran
 Priority:  supercritical                        |         Status:  new
Component:  code-mutable                         |      Milestone:  1.11.0
 Keywords:  Mutable, Integrity, non-repudiation  |        Version:  1.9.2
  lack                                           |  Launchpad Bug:
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 I have been testing the LAFS-Tahoe V1.9.2 package. It is observed that
 during the user/storage-server uploading and downloading(files) processes
 there is a lack that one critical link missing that is required to track
 data stored in cloud storage.

 Though communication is happening over SSL, a user/server may refuse the
 sender's/receiver's certificate. So any one of them could be malicious.

 Atleast there should be a signed message digest.

 So, while uploading a document how a user can trust the Storage Server.

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Ticket URL: <https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/1874>
tahoe-lafs <https://tahoe-lafs.org>
secure decentralized storage