[tahoe-lafs-trac-stream] [tahoe-lafs] #127: Cap URLs leaked via HTTP Referer header

[tahoe-lafs]

#127: Cap URLs leaked via HTTP Referer header
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     Reporter:  warner   |      Owner:  davidsarah
         Type:  defect   |     Status:  assigned
     Priority:  major    |  Milestone:  1.11.0
    Component:  code-    |    Version:  0.7.0
  frontend-web           |   Keywords:  confidentiality integrity
   Resolution:           |  preservation capleak
Launchpad Bug:           |
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Comment (by davidsarah):

 Replying to [comment:32 ChosenOne]:
 > The noreferrer attribute on links could prevent leaking dircaps when
 clicking the link to a potentially malicious html file on the WUI
 > http://www.whatwg.org/specs/web-apps/current-work/multipage/links.html
 #link-type-noreferrer

 [attachment:restrict-referrer-leakage.txt] is a more complete and simpler
 solution, as the spec says:

 > The effect of this directive with an empty set of allowed referrer
 recipients includes the effect of treating all links from the affected
 documents as having the _noreferrer link type_ [HTML5]. However, this
 directive:
 > * applies to all requests, rather than only to requests made as a result
 of following links defined by an HTML 'a' or 'area' element;
 > * does not require rewriting links to have the noreferrer type;
 > * enables the set of allowed referrer recipients to be controlled,
 subject to any other user-agent-dependent restrictions as mentioned above;
 > * is resistant to content injection attacks (at least in the case where
 the Content-Security-Policy is specified by HTTP header).

 (We don't need the third point but the other three are important, because
 rewriting is hard.)

-- 
Ticket URL: <https://tahoe-lafs.org/trac/tahoe-lafs/ticket/127#comment:35>
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