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Things still left to do before launch:

• fix zfec to install under 2.4 (the relative ..util in cmdline.zfec breaks byte-compilation)
• set up public testnet
  • upgrade tahoebs1,tahoecs1 to latest build
  • add links to wiki
• mirror darcs repo to org
  • currently done hourly, should change to be on-demand
• proxy buildbot waterfall to dev
  • disable force-build on the proxied view
  • obsfuscate email addresses on the waterfall
• mirror figleaf coverage data to org on each build
• split tahoe APT repo out from the rest
  • mirror it to org on each build
• make figleaf coverage munin graph visible
• move tahoe docs from dev to org
• decide on use of SSL
• mailing list
• trac-darcs plugin, trac code browser
• decide about obsfuscating email addresses
  • hack trac-darcs to munge addresses on the way in, that should take care of leakage through trac

Lower priority items:

• fix python2.5-vs-2.4 API warning in neo_cgi, neo_cs stuff
• get support debs into repository (foolscap?)
  • get support tarballs into repository
• update license in tahoe .debs to reflect GPLness
• XMLRPC plugin for trac, to enable easier wiki editing (from emacs)

The spec calls for consistent encryption. The use case calls for optional per-user encryption keys. We could even just generate random ones each time we go to upload a file.

The implementation is currrently stubbed out to use a key of all zeros.

The URI currently contains separate readkey and StorageIndex fields. We should redefine the read-cap CHK file URI to include just the readkey and derive the StorageIndex from it by hashing.