Changes between Version 15 and Version 16 of NewMutableEncodingDesign

Timestamp:

2010-01-13T00:47:27Z (15 years ago)

Author:

davidsarah

Comment:

write caps need to be at least K + T bits

NewMutableEncodingDesign

@@ -132 +132 @@
 (in Figure 3). The design is:
 
- * (1K) writecap = K-bit random string (perhaps derived from user-supplied
-   material) (remember, K=kappa, probably 128bits)
+ * (K + T) writecap = (K+T)-bit random string, perhaps derived from user-supplied
+   material (remember, K=kappa, probably 128bits)
  * (minimum 2K) readcap = minimum 2*K-bit semiprivate key
  * (minimum 2K) verifycap = public key
- * storage-index = truncated verifycap
+ * storage-index = (possibly truncated) verifycap
 
 On each publish, a random salt is generated and stored in the share. The data
@@ -151 +151 @@
 Like above, but create two levels of semiprivate keys instead of just one:
 
- * (1K) writecap = K-bit random string
+ * (K + T) writecap = (K+T)-bit random string
  * (minimum 2K) readcap = minimum 2*K-bit first semiprivate key
  * (minimum 2K) traversalcap = minimum 2*K-bit second semiprivate key
  * (minimum 2K) verifycap = public key
- * storage-index = truncated verifycap
+ * storage-index = (possibly truncated) verifycap
 
 The dirnode encoding would use H(writecap) to protect the child writecaps,
@@ -170 +170 @@
 private key out of the share and into the writecap:
 
- * (K) writecap = K-bit random string = privkey
+ * (K + T) writecap = (K+T)-bit random string = privkey
  * (2K + T) readcap = H(writecap)[:K] + H(pubkey)[:K+T]
  * (K + T) verifycap = H(pubkey)[:K+T]
- * storage-index = truncated verifycap
+ * storage-index = verifycap
 
 In this case, the readcap/verifycap holder is obligated to fetch the pubkey
@@ -188 +188 @@
 requiring the client to fetch a copy:
 
- * (K) writecap = K-bit random string = privkey
+ * (K + T) writecap = (K+T)-bit random string = privkey
  * (minimum 3K) readcap = H(writecap)[:K] + pubkey
  * (minimum 2K) verifycap = pubkey
@@ -206 +206 @@
 doesn't even change the way the existing caps are used:
 
- * (1K) writecap = K-bit random string = privkey
+ * (K + T) writecap = (K+T)-bit random string = privkey
  * (2K + T) readcap = H(writecap)[:K] + H(pubkey)[:K+T]
  * (2K + T) traversalcap: H(readcap)[:K] + H(pubkey)[:K+T]
  * (K + T) verifycap = H(pubkey)[:K+T]
- * storage-index = truncated verifycap
+ * storage-index = verifycap
 
 == Shorter readcaps (insecure) ==