Changes between Version 19 and Version 20 of OneHundredYearCryptography


Ignore:
Timestamp:
2012-02-12T23:49:17Z (13 years ago)
Author:
davidsarah
Comment:

Julian's GMSS implementation is not stateful

Legend:

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  • OneHundredYearCryptography

    v19 v20  
    3232Zooko posted [https://tahoe-lafs.org/pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-February/006133.html "back of the envelope" performance constraints]. Bottom-line: you get 30 million ARM instructions to implement one complete digital signature verification.
    3333
    34 Julian Wälde has [http://tahoe-lafs.org/pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-March/006237.html posted an actual implementation] of (stateful) hash-based digital signatures! Exciting fact: his implementation [//pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-July/006554.html meets] Zooko's [//pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-February/006133.html performance criteria]!
     34Julian Wälde has [http://tahoe-lafs.org/pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-March/006237.html posted an actual implementation] of hash-based digital signatures! Exciting fact: his implementation [//pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-July/006554.html meets] Zooko's [//pipermail/tahoe-dev/2011-February/006133.html performance criteria]!
    3535
    3636Brian and David-Sarah wrote [source:trunk/misc/simulators/hashbasedsig.py a simulator] or two to explore performance trade-offs in (stateless) hash-based signature parameters. The output of one run with the following parameters is this (note that the signing times include regeneration of per-message signing keys from a small long-term private key):